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difficult to get the two terms of the relation to close quarters. And the divergence of views on the subject is sufficient evidence of the difficulty. Hegel himself was a conservative; but the Hegelians who have most distinguished themselves in economics have maintained that the present industrial order is but a stage in the development of Socialism, without considering where the further dialectic of the notion may carry them. Darwin was an individualist, who felt himself reluctantly compelled by his theory of natural selection to approve all forms of competition; while some of his followers look to Darwinian development to bring about a Socialistic state, although Darwinism gives little support to their private belief that the Socialistic state will prove itself the fittest to survive. The truth seems to be that the theory of Evolution has little to say on the question, just because it is a theory of processes without being a theory of ends. Mr. Bonar's conclusion is that it contains nothing "to point us clearly to any centralization of all industrial organization in the State." He bids the individualist rest at ease. "Men will never sell their liberty to purchase a compulsory equality and fraternity, and if socialism became a tyranny it would have a short life."

The editor and publishers of the "Library of Philosophy" are to be congratulated on having obtained for the series this "first attempt to present a view of the relations of philosophy and economics through the whole of their history." There is perhaps no one better qualified than Mr. Bonar to speak with authority on both subjects; and this "first attempt" is likely to be the standard history for a long time to come.

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AN OUTLINE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By W. A. Watt, M.A., LL.B. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Pp. ix, 184.

This book is described as "an attempt to state shortly and simply some of the main principles which underlie the facts of law." The author endeavors to "focus upon jurisprudence the various lights derived from historic, 'analytic,' and philosophic sources," and the underlying conception of the book may be said to be Hegelian. But this conception is rather implicit than explicit, and the book would have been clearer to the uninstructed reader if the author had thrown into an Introduction what he has

relegated to an Appendix upon "The Conditions of Right," in which he justifies the philosophical stand-point. It is there shown, or rather indicated, how such a metaphysic of right as is given in Hegel or Green "yields, in ethics, a theory of common good and in jurisprudence a theory of social right, both based on personality and implying an ultimate end." But the author seems anxious to keep on a line with common sense, or, at any rate, not to prejudice his inquiry by "transcendental" conceptions; and such ideas as that of the state as the universal, of the organic conception of legal authority, of property as the realization of will, and the like, are stated rather than developed, or even occur as *obiter dicta*. A more definite statement, also, of the relation between the "historic," "analytic," and "philosophic" methods would have been appropriate. The idea of jurisprudence as "philosophical criticism applied to law" is a so much more familiar conception in German than in English law-books that it seems to require explicit consideration, if not justification. A philosophical reader, on the other hand, has every reason to be satisfied with the method adopted. How fruitful are the working conceptions which Hegel has provided for the study of law, as of every other concrete product of "spirit," may be gathered from Mr. Watt's handling of juristic conceptions; it is permeated with the kind of view of which the "Philosophy of Right" and Green's "Lectures on Political Obligation" are classical statements. It is this that gives to the book a unity "which may be felt" and makes it the reverse of mechanical; and it is this that makes the author so sensitive to the aspect of law as the reflection of a growing and expanding social life, as indeed being like life itself, "many" and yet "one,"—"sweeping onward" and therefore at no point final, "sweeping onward" and therefore to an end. The whole book is worked out with much skill and sense of proportion, and its expression of principles is at once simple, clear, and exact (*e.g.*, "justice might be roughly explained to be the obtaining by each man of what is appropriate to his character as it expresses itself in life"); the statement of Hegel's conception of the relation between the "phases" of Property, Contract, and Penalty is admirable, as is also the criticism of Kant's system of Natural Right.

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